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Based on the political support function model by Hillman (1982), we consider 
the choice of policy instruments in environmental regulation. More specifically, 
we extend the Hillman model so that it can incorporate the connection between 
the relative strength of lobby groups, the chosen level of regulation and the 
choice of instrument to facilitate the achievement of this level. We apply this 
model to explain the shift from auction to grandfathered emission trading in the 
EU. When explaining this shift in policy, we focus on climate change policy 
and the three main interest groups, namely industry, consumers and environ-
mentalists. From a pure economic point of view, taxation or auctions are clearly 
preferable to grandfathering. However, from our political economy model, the 
opposite conclusion might emerge, suggesting the counter-intuitive result that 
grandfathering, compared to taxation and auction, might give a stronger pres-
sure to increase the emission target level. 
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In the following we will offer an explanation of the choice of instruments to 
control environmental problems from a political economy perspective, i.e. 
where the relative strength of influential interest groups determines policy. We 
will apply this model to the European Union (EU) policy to implement its 
Kyoto target level. In particular, we set out to offer a theoretical explanation for 
why the EU suddenly shifted from green taxation to a grandfathered permit sys-
tem. 
 
We furthermore analyse the likely consequences of this shift on the prospect of 
achieving the Kyoto target. This is an important analysis, since there exists a 
complex interaction between choice of instrument and the resulting support for 
a given level of environmental protection, resulting in ‘counter intuitive’ re-
sults, which not support common sense reasoning. In particular, common sense 
suggests that when it becomes less costly for the regulated party to comply with 
the regulation, then such a party will display less resistance to the regulation. 
This, goes the logic, makes it easier to achieve the stated target or even enables 
the regulator to get support for stricter regulation. Our analysis shows that un-
der realistic conditions, this logic is not supported, implying serious implication 
for the EU climate change policy. 
 
Our theoretical starting point is a political economy perspective and the politi-
cal support function model by Hillman (1982). The contribution is to extend 
this model to include the relative strengths of competing interest groups. Differ-
ent interest groups often have conflicting interests in situations where the 
choice of instrument is determined by the relative strength of groups. Becker 
(1983, p 380) states that ‘the political effectiveness of a group is mainly deter-
mined not by its absolute efficiency, but by its efficiency relative to the effi-
ciency of other groups’. Competing interest groups will lobby to achieve rents, 
and therefore an understanding of lobbyism is crucial to an understanding of 
distortive EU policies. Therefore, we incorporate lobby group interests in the 
political area of environmental regulation, enabling the analysis of the connec-
 
7tion between the relative strength of a lobby group and the determination of 
both the level of environmental regulation and the choice of instrument. The 
lesson is that choice of instrument and choice of environmental target level 
cannot be seen as independent due to political resistance and support. 
 
The connection between choice of instrument and level of environmental pro-
tection has been analysed in several papers. Boom (2001) shows, in the case of 
a tradable permit system market, that it is rational for potential selling countries 
to opt for higher emission levels and for potential buying countries to accept a 
more stringent emission ceiling (compared to the situation without trade). This 
is explained by the fact that increases in the total trade volume imply lower re-
duction costs for the buying country and higher total payments to the selling 
country. The existence of a connection between type of instrument employed 
and prospect of achieving a given reduction target is analysed in, e.g., Brandt 
and Svendsen (2002). They argue that the costs of implementing the Kyoto-
targets have significantly effects on the prospect of actually achieving the origi-
nal targets. We provide a theoretical framework based on lobbying activities to 
analyze such a connection. 
 
Environmental regulation is often analysed in a principal-agent relationship. In 
such a framework, the idea is to design an efficient regulation from the princi-
pal’s point of view, subject to participation constraints. When the principal is 
the government, the use of (pigouvian) taxes has received much attention, as the 
“superior” way to internalize the external costs of pollution. In principal, the 
use of an emissions trading system where the permits are auctioned is equiva-
lent to taxes. The superiority of these instruments from the point of view of so-
ciety, compared to, e.g., an emissions trading system where the permits are 
grandfathered is noted by Cramton and Kerr (2002). Such systems can result in 
reduced tax distortions (see i.e. Goulder, Parry and Burtraw, 1997), provide 
more flexibility in distribution of costs, provide greater incentives for innova-
tion and reduce the need for politically contentious arguments over the alloca-
tion of rents. 
 
8However, such an approach neglects important features of the regulatory rela-
tionship. As pointed out by Spulber (1989), the actual adoption of a policy is 
preceded by a so-called regulatory process, the outcome of which determines 
how the regulation will be structured. Dijkstra (1999) and Svendsen (1998; 
1999) argue that one major difficulty when putting theory into practice is the 
absence of political acceptability of environmental taxes within producer com-
munities. Internationally, the use of taxes as an instrument to regulate pollution 
has proved almost impossible.  Moreover, as a financial measure, a tax must be 
adopted unanimously in the Council of Financial Ministers. Owing to strong 
opposition from industry and key member states, it has so far proved impossible 
to achieve such a consensus. According to Stavins (1998): “many actors in the 
system have reason to favour freely allocated tradable over other market-based 
instruments” (p. 75). The approach that Stavins uses is what he calls a political 
market framework, which consists of the demand for environmental policy in-
struments by individuals, firms, and interest groups, and their supply by the leg-
islature and regulatory agencies. Based on the US SO2 allowance trading sys-
tem, he then lists which instruments different agents prefer. Brandt and Svend-
sen (2003) show, by invoking rent-seeking theory and by analysing the Green 
Paper hearing replies from the main industrial groups, that rent-seeking (or 
lobbyism) affects the design of environmental regulation and energy policy in 
favour of well-organized industrial interest groups. They argue that some firms 
are likely to reap a net gain from being regulated by a grandfathered emission 
trading system. This is so because total costs of emission reduction and lobby-
ism are likely to be smaller than the total rents from having this type of regula-
tion. 
 
There has recently been a rather remarkable change in EU’s position on the use 
of GHG emissions trading in climate policy. Why did the EU suddenly support 
emissions trading? This question is addressed in Gagelmann and Hansjürgens 
(2002). They state that while the progress of all member states seems to indicate 
that half the Kyoto commitment had been achieved by 1999 (-4%), a closer 
look reveals that this was mainly due to considerable reductions in two large 
countries, namely Germany and the UK. The current performance of most other 
 
9countries seems to fall short of their targets.
1 The European Commission (CEU, 
2000b) recognized that any further potential reductions in Germany and the EU 
would not be at the same level.
2 
 
Christiansen and Wetterstad (2003) argue that the main reason for the Commis-
sion to propose the use of grandfathering is largely due to the perception that 
the chances of getting a system in place by 2005 could be undermined by oppo-
sition from key member states and lobby groups representing incumbents that 
would have to pay for allowances. Therefore, grandfathered emissions trading 
and free initial allocation of permits could prove instrumental for ensuring a 
cost-effective implementation of abatement policies across the EU. Thus, po-
litical reality implies that policy makers are confronted by special interest 
groups that pursue private goals, which may conflict with the overall goals of 
society. If dominant interest groups do not like a particular proposal, they may 
block it and policy makers will not succeed in achieving the desired environ-
mental target levels. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the theoretical part (section 2), we present 
a model for an influential function approach to an environmental target level. It 
shows how lobby groups can determine the level of environmental regulation 
and the choice of instrument. Finally, we discuss the implications of combining 
the determination of target level and instrument choice. In the empirical part 
(Section 3), we look at the innovative case of EU climate change policy. After 
discussing EU lobbyism in general, we present interest group activities and 
combine these with the theoretical findings from the first part. Section 4 con-
cludes the paper. 
                                                           
1  This view is supported in Christiansen and Wetterstad (2003), who note that the Commission 
projects that by 2010 total GHG emissions will increase by 1% and CO2 emissions by 4% rela-
tive to the base year of 1990, compared to the Kyoto target of an 8% reductions. Without Ger-
many and the UK, the remaining countries have experienced an increase in emissions of 7.1% 
from 1990 to 1999. 
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2  Schleich et al. (2001) make an in-depth analysis of the German case and conclude that the like-
lihood of it achieving the more ambitious national target without additional policy efforts ap-
pears to be rather slim. 2.  The model: Influential function approach 
2.1. Introduction 
Traditionally, relationships between industry and environment policy have been 
examined in terms of impact. In such an approach, environmental policies are 
given and firms react to them. The firms simply comply with the laws. How-
ever, environmental standards, taxes and subsidies do not come out of the blue. 
They are the end result of a series of consultations and negotiations between 
policy makers and interested parties (industrial associations, consumers, asso-
ciations, green groups). According to Lévêque and Nadaï (1995) a firm’s in-
volvement can take several forms. Firms can, e.g., support public authority in-
tervention, hinder public authority intervention by making use of their obstruc-
tive power, take voluntary action under the threat of government intervention or 
cooperate with the government in defining environmental policies. 
 
In this paper we take the political economy point of view that environmental 
policy is determined by the relative strength of stakeholder groups, called lobby 
groups. We will call any such actives by interest groups as lobby activity. How-
ever, different interest groups have different (and sometimes) opposing objec-
tives (like the industry and the environmental groups on environmental regula-
tion). In such a situation the relative strength of the lobby groups determines the 
outcome. 
 
The relative strength of a particular interest group depends on numerous factors, 
including the policy maker’s preferences and the cost or benefit of the proposed 
regulation. However, lobbyism is also determined by the size of the group: The 
smaller the group size, the more effectively it can lobby. Support for this is that 
the marginal benefit of an average individual’s effort falls with the aggregate 
effort of others. Olson (1965) states that the commonality of the goals of an in-
terest group’s members makes the achievement of these goals a public good for 
the group, which thus gives rise to the same incentives to free-ride as exist in all 
public good-prisoners’ dilemma situations. Two important conclusions can be 
 
11drawn from this observation: (1) It is easier to form an interest group when the 
number of potential members is small than when the number is large; and (2) 
Thus, the establishment of an organisation that effectively represents large 
numbers of individuals requires that “separate and ‘selective’ incentives” be 
used to curb free-riding behaviour. The obvious conclusion is that groups of 
small size, with homogenous members with comparable goals will be more ef-
fective than groups representing a large number of heterogeneous individuals 
with only partly comparable goals. We come back to the effectiveness of inter-
est groups in section 6, when analysing the EU case. 
 
In the following, we assume a political economy framework, where the politi-
cians who decide the environmental policy only care about how to achieve 
maximum support for their policy. In a political support function approach, it is 
asserted that the political support depends upon the welfare levels of gainers’ 
and losers’ (in our case determined by the severity of environmental regula-
tion). In the model we consider three different interest groups. First, the indus-
try groups actually undertake the reductions and bear the direct costs of regula-
tion. Besides wanting to avoid the regulation, their objectives are to receive as 
high rents as possible from regulating by lobby for regulation (instruments) that 
yields a comparative advantage over either competitors or entrants. 
 
Second, consumer groups that suffer from increased product prices due to costs 
induced by the regulation on the producers of goods must be expected to sup-
port regulation that yields the smallest spill over to consumer prices. Third, the 
environmental groups (the ones that benefit from cutbacks on emissions) sup-
port as high environmental quality as possible. 
2.2.  Choice of environmental target 
The political support function in Hillman (1982) is defined as:  
 
) ), ( ), ( (
~
Q Q P Q M M Π = . 
 
12Here Q is the level of reduction of the pollutant in question compared to the 
situation without any regulation, Π is the profit to the industry facing the regu-
lation (including the rent from regulation), P is the consumer price (could be a 
price index). 
 
Industry motives are given by    0 >
Π ∂







∂ . (Diminishing marginal in-
dustry support).    0 >
Π ∂
∂M implies that the more profitable a policy from the point 
of view of the interest groups, the more support this policy receives from the 
interest groups. However, marginally, this effect is declining.
3 The Industry 





. Although higher regulation increases prices, the net effect on profit is 
still negative. Hence, higher regulation leads to increasing resistance from in-
dustry groups. 
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ginal consumer support). Consumers support policies that reduce consumer 
prices, but marginally this effect is declining. The effect of regulation on output 




P , and hence, consumers also dislike environmental regulation.
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3  An argument for this is that given that the marginal reduction costs are strictlt convex in Q, 
then the higher the regulation, the higher the reduction costs. 
4  This is the case for all downward sloping demand curves. 
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5  An argument for this is its connection with strict convex damage costs (in emission levels). 
From a given point of emission, the additional environmental benefit from reducing emission is 
declining. If the only choice variable for the policy maker is Q, then a political equilib-
rium is achieved when the marginal influence or the marginal support from the 







































∂  measures how changes in Q alter the support from interest groups 
through its effect on profit. The expression is negative, since higher regulation 









∂  measures how changes 
in Q alter the support from consumers through its effect on consumer prices. 
The expression is negative, since higher regulation leads to higher prices and 




∂  is positive. The optimal Q is given by the 
point where the total support is maximized, indicated by Q
* in figure 1. 
 




























Small increases in Q (from Q = 0) yield high marginal support from environ-
mentalists, but small negative support from both industry and consumers.
6 At 
Q
*, the highest total support is achieved. 
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6  Interestingly, producers and consumers have the same interest to get as small an increase in 
product prices as possible. In order to proceed, it will be easier to assume a linear support function of the 
type  Q Q P Q M γ β α + + = ) ( ) ( Π

















M                                                            (2)
 
The advantage of this linearization is that the constants α, β and γ can be inter-
preted as the weight that the policy makers put on the three different groups, 
hence, let α be the weight put on industrial interests, β the weight put on con-
sumer interests, and γ the weight put on environmental interests. 
 
Using expression (1), we can determine how changes in the relative weights 
that the policy makers put on the interest groups, change the level of regulation. 























Q   (c).                                          (3)
These can be interpreted as, the higher the weight of the industry group or the 
consumer group, the smaller the regulation, and the higher the weight of the en-
vironmental groups, the higher the regulation. In figure 2 these effects are 
shown.
7 
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7  These weights can be interpreted as political weights, i.e. dependent on type of government. 
Typically, for a right wing party, α/β is higher than for a left wing party (see Daugbjerg and 
Svendsen, 2001).  
Figure 2a. Higher weight to indus-
trial interests decreases Q
* 
Figure 2b. Higher weight to envi-
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2.3. Choice  of  instrument 
In order to determine the choice of instruments, we cannot apply the above 
model, since it builds on marginal changes. Switching from one instrument pre-
sumably yields a non-marginal change in the payoffs for the agents. However, 
as long as reduction targets are chosen independently of choice of instruments 
then the reduction target can be thought of as being fixed, and the question re-
mains, how to implement this. (This could be the case when considering the 
choice of instrument to implement the Kyoto-target, since the level of reduction 
is already determined by the 1997 Kyoto Agreement. (In section 5 we try to 
compare choice of instrument and choice of reduction level in order to give a 
hint about how easy it will be to actually implement the Kyoto-target). 
 
We consider two types of instruments, one based on a grandfathered tradable 
permit system (TPS) and one based on auction. Our intention is to be able to 
analyse the choice of instruments.
8 
 
                                                           
 
16
8  This approach can be used to compare any instruments. Definition: An instrument (I
1) is called superior to another instrument (I
2), if: 
 and  , for all   and at least one strict 
inequality. 








a Q P Q P ≤ Q Q
a ∈
 
We will apply the above definition to compare the grandfathered and auctioned 
approaches. The way to do this is to ask, for the same level of environmental 
quality, which type the industry and the consumers prefer. In order to combine 
the two instruments, we can use the following result: 
 
Result 1: Given fully competitive markets, for same the level of regulation, the 
grandfathered system yields higher rents to industry, but equal output prices 
(Brandt and Svendsen, 2003).
9 
 
As shown in Brandt and Svendsen (2003), the incumbent firms receive a rent 
from regulation under the grandfathered system. The rent comes from holding a 
factor that is scarce, in this case the permits.
10 The value of this holding is given 
by the market evaluation of the value of the endowment of permits that the in-
cumbent holds. Hence, the incumbent firm clearly prefers the grandfathered ap-
proach, since no rent is available in the case of an auction. Although the incum-
bent firms (the ones that receive the permits for free) have lower costs of pro-
duction than potential entrants equipped with similar technology to the incum-
bents, the endowment of permits has an opportunity cost that adds to the in-
cumbent firms’ costs (the firm is wasting the potential revenue from selling the 
permits). However, this value can only be realised by not using the permits (and 
selling them). If a firm uses its permits, it loses (foregoes) this opportunity. 
Hence, using the permit has an opportunity cost equal to the value of the en-
dowment of the permits. In this case, the costs for the incumbent are equal in 
both cases (grandfathered or auctioned tradable permit systems). 
 
                                                           
9  This result hinges on several assumptions, including perfectly competitive product and permit 
markets and perfect capital markets. 
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10  See Koustaal, 1997, for more examples of this type of rent. The grandfathered permit system does not yield a cost-advantage to the incum-
bent firms compared to (potential) entrants, because the grandfathered permit 
system does not create any barriers to entry and does not reduce the pressure 
coming from potential profit seeking entrants, thus the incumbent firms still 
have incentives to act efficiently in the product market.
11 Therefore, product 
prices can be expected to be equal in both situations. 
 
We conclude that   and  , for all  . This 
implies: 








a Q P Q P = Q Q
a ∈
 
Proposition 1: A Grandfathered TPS is strongly preferred to Auctioned TPS 
for the same level of environmental quality. 
2.4. Implications 
In the previous section we argued that for a fixed environmental target, none of 
the three interest groups would object to choosing grandfathered over an auc-
tioned TPS approach. Let’s now ask the following question: if Q is determined 
on the presumption of an auctioned approach, would this level of Q also maxi-
mize the overall support if switching to a grandfathered approach? 
 
Common sense would suggest that since interest groups strongly prefer a grand-
fathered to an auction system, while the other interest groups are indifferent, a 
higher level of reductions of emissions would be the equilibrium outcome. In 
this case, since the interest groups are better off in the grandfathered case, it 
could also be argued that it will be easier to achieve the pre-determined emis-
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11  The grandfathered system does not create a barrier to entry. To verify this claim, let us be more 
specific about what is meant by a barrier to entry. There exists no uniformly agreed upon defi-
nition of what an entry barrier is. However, in our case it has been argued that a grandfathered 
system yields a cost advantage to the incumbent firms. A useful and satisfactory definition is 
given by Bain (1965, p.3): ‘A barrier to entry exists where established sellers in an industry 
have an advantage over potential entrant sellers, where this advantage is reflected in the extent 
to which established sellers can persistently raise their prices above the competitive level with-
out attracting new firms to enter the industry’. sions target. We have to remember, however, that the support function is based 
on marginal gains, which in turn might differ from the absolute gain a group 
might achieve from different instruments. 
 
In order to compare the two approaches, let’s fix the reduction level at the op-
timal level in the auction case, denoted Q .  Auchion Q Q P Q M A | )] ), ( ), ( ( max[ arg * Π =



























∂ ) * ( ) * ( since there is no differ-
ence between the effects of the two approaches on the product prices. This 
means that the consumer groups are indifferent between the two approaches. 
 
In the auction market, when less permits are issued, then all firms buy fewer 
permits (which reduces costs), but on the other hand, the price of the permits 
increases, which makes the demanded permits more expensive. In the grand-
fathered approach, when firms are given less permits, then, since the permit 
prices increase, the value of the permits increases, but the number of permits is 
reduced, and, depending on how the permit price changes when Q changes, the 
incumbent will support more or less emission reductions compared to the auc-
tion approach. Moreover, in the presence of entrants, the holders of the permits 
earn more rent. 
 
Let’s look into this issue. Let z0 be the number of permits (one permit repre-
sents one unit of emission) that an incumbent firm receives, while z measures 
the number of permits this firm holds after trading in the permit market. Let pz 
be the permit price. If  >0, then the firm is a seller of permits, and if 
<0, then it is a buyer. Abatement costs are given by  , where e
) ( 0 z z −
) ( 0 z z − ) ( 0 z e c − 0 is 
the initial level of emissions. Output is denoted by y and its price is py. 
 
Profit for the firms given regulation in the two situations is: 
 
)) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( 0 0 Q z e c Q z Q z Q p y p z y GF − − − ⋅ + ⋅ = Π                                                    (4a)
 
19)) ( ( ) ( ) ( 0 Q z e c Q z Q p y p z y A − − ⋅ + ⋅ = Π .                                                     (4b)
 
Since output prices are equal under the two approaches, the difference in profits 
is:  , which is equal to the rent to the incumbent firms in a 
grandfathered system. 
) ( ) ( 0 Q z Q pz A GF ⋅ = Π − Π
 
How does the profit change when Q changes? In order to analyse this, differen-
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is negative, since higher z reduces the permit price, and this reduces the value of 
all permits a firm holds. This effect gives incentives for the firm to lobby for 
fewer permits. The gain from receiving one more permit is  , which gives the 
firm an incentive to lobby for more permits. Note that this is the same trade off 
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price effect is strong, and  0



















0 will increase pz significantly. And the incumbent will lobby for 
fewer permits, which is illustrated in figure 3a. 
 
20Figure 3a: Switching from auction to 
grandfathered increases Q
* 
when  1 0 − > > ε  
Figure 3b: Switching from auction to 
grandfathered reduces Q
* 
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( 1 − > ε ), then the price effect is weak, and  0













A GF π π , 
which implies that  . In this case reducing z
* *
A GF Q Q < 0 will not increase pz signifi-
cantly. And the incumbent will lobby for more permits, which is illustrated in 
figure 3b. These results are summarized in proposition 2: 
 











= ε  . When  1 > ε , then Q , that is, the incum-
bent firms lobby for more permits, and when 
* *
A GF Q <
1 < ε , then Q , the incum-
bent firms lobby for less permits. 
* *
A GF Q >
 
Given a linear relationship between the price of the permits and the number of 
permits grandfathered, as shown in figure 4, we have that when the number of 
permits is small ( 1 > ε ), then  , that is, the incumbent firms lobby for 
more permits, while when the number of permits is large (
* *
A GF Q Q <
1 < ε ), then  , 
that is, the incumbent firms lobby for fewer permits. 
* *
A GF Q Q >
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A GF Q Q <  
1 = ε
* *
A GF Q Q >
 
Are their certain cases where it is more likely that incumbent firms lobby for 
more (less) permits. When marginal reduction costs are high (low) (at zo), then 
reductions in zo increase prices by a lot (a little) and it is more likely that in-
cumbents lobby for less (more) permits. When there are many entrants, changes 
in zo have a larger effect on permit prices, since entrants have to buy their way 
into the market, and it is more likely that the incumbents lobby for fewer per-
mits. 
 
When marginal reduction costs are low and the number of entrants is small, 
then the incumbent will lobby for more permits and Q will be smaller (less 
strict regulation), while when marginal reduction costs are high and the number 
of entrants is large, then the incumbent will lobby for fewer permits and Q will 




Our overall conclusion from section 2 is that the industrial groups have the 
highest relative strength. In the notation of equation (2), α >β and α > γ, which 
implies from (3) that Q
* should turn out to be relatively small. This can explain 
the observation that most EU countries fall short of their Kyoto targets. The ini-
tial instruments of CO2 tax and an auctioned permit trading system would have 
implied high costs on the most important interest group. As noted by 
Christiansen and Wetterstad (2003), emissions trading could prove instrumental for insuring a cost-effective implementation of abatement policies across the 
EU. However, our results do not necessarily support such an argument. While 
switching from auction to a grandfathered system is obviously preferred by the 
industrial groups, the effect of this on the longer run support for the Kyoto tar-
get depends on how the permit price responds to changes in the number of 
grandfathered permits. This is particularly important since the industry group, 
as will be seen in section 3, is the group with the most influence on environ-
mental regulation in the EU. 
3.  The case of the EU climate change policy 
3.1. EU  lobbyism 
Does lobbying matter for the choice of (environmental) policy in the EU? In 
order to answer this question, note that interest groups can be defined as a range 
of organisations outside the formal institutions that seek to influence decision-
making (George and Bache, 2001). They can be informative and bring attention 
to concerns otherwise neglected. However, they can also seek to influence regu-
lation in their own favour by maximizing their share of the EU income ‘pie’. 
This happens in a pluralist system with competitive lobbying similar to that of 
the United States. Therefore, Brussels is more like Washington DC than the na-
tional capitals in the EU.
12 Each interest group seeks, by lobby activity, to influ-
ence policy making in its preferred direction. 
 
In fact, one may argue that pluralism in the EU is less ‘pluralistic’ than that of 
the United States because the EU Commission as the agenda-setter has much 
greater control over the entire process of interest representation, in comparison 
with the United States where any interest that organises itself is regarded as le-
gitimate so long as it can make itself heard. In the EU, only those interests the 
Commission chooses to legitimise, and thus allows into the process, will be 
heard (Schmidt, 1999 and Varming et al., 2000). 
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12  The same idea can be used when explaining why the EU cannot implement, for example, CO2 
taxation rather than the economically less efficient CO2 trading system.  
Lobbyism plays an important role in a pluralist system, and it is crucial for any 
interest group to hire the best lobbyists and to have a base in Brussels – ‘the in-
sider’s town’. Why? Because personal contact and ‘networking’ is fundamental 
when building trust and social capital between lobbyists and EU bureaucrats. 
Bureaucrats are not fully informed about all issues and therefore they need rela-
tionships of trust where they can use the information that the lobbyist brings 
them as an objective source for getting access to background information before 
final decision-making (see Paldam and Svendsen, 2000 and 2004, concerning 
trust and the notion of social capital). 
 
EU Parliament started a debate about how to regulate lobbyism in 1992. A self-
regulatory code for interest groups was proposed but rejected after heated de-
bates during the 1990s. In other words, the EU has not been able to introduce a 
self-regulatory code to regulate lobbyism. Furthermore what ‘started life as a 
debate about the regulation of lobbying in the Parliament ended as a highly 
politicised contest between party groupings over the declaration of members’ 
assets and receipts of gifts’, Greenwood (1997, p. 97). This total failure to regu-
late lobbyism and prevent corruption, highlights the need for clear-cut rules and 
tough sanctions in case of illegal behaviour. 
 
In 1992, the Commission estimated that 3,000 interest groups (Euro groups) 
and about 10,000 professional lobbyists were active in Brussels (CEU, 1992). 
At the same time, roughly 25,000 bureaucrats were permanently employed in 
EU institutions. This gives us what we could call a ‘lobbyist-bureaucrat ratio’ 
of 2.5, meaning that for each lobbyist there are two and a half bureaucrats em-
ployed. 
 
The Commission has encouraged lobbying groups to register on the internet and 
to up-date their data. In 2002 this website run by the Commission contained 
about 1,000 interest groups (CEU, 2002a). Furthermore, the Commission pro-
vides information about EU interest groups on its own website (CEU, 2002b). 
As is evident from these websites, business interests clearly dominate the lob-
 
24bying groups in Brussels, and they have been rapidly growing over time due to 
the growing competence of EU institutions. Kurrild-Klitgaard (1998, p. 289) 
writes, based on Naets (1990), that the number of European interest groups was 
59 in 1954 and 546 in 1984. Compared to the level of 3,000 in 1992, the num-
ber of interest groups has increased more than five times since 1984 and more 
than 50 times since 1954. 
 
Furthermore, most EU pressure groups (83 per cent) are involved in promoting 
business interests while only very few represent the large groups of consumers 
and taxpayers (Kurrild-Klitgaard (1998) based on Pierce (1991) and Vaubel 
(1994)). This development is in line with the maxim ‘where power goes, inter-
est groups follow’ (George and Bache, 2001, p. 290). Greenwood and Aspin-
wall (1998, p.3) found, in their 1995 survey on 693 formal EU interest groups, 
that two-thirds of these interest groups were business groups, whereas only one 
percent of the formal interest groups investigated belonged to consumer organi-
sations. One-fifth belonged to public interests, such as environmental groups or 
aid organisations. 
3.2. Industry 
The fact that business and multinationals dominate the political arena fits the 
logic of group size described in Section 2. These groups have small-number ad-
vantages and are also homogeneous and most powerful in terms of resources. 
 
Six new powerful actors were created in the early 1980s and they are strongly 
influence decision-making in the EU. The most influential of those actors is the 
business group called the European Roundtable of Industrialists. Its members 
consist of 45 leading EU companies. The second group is the EU committee of 
AmCham, which is a group of American multinational corporations. The third 
actor is the Transatlantic Business Dialogue. It represents large companies 
seeking to shape the US-EU trade and investment agenda. Fourth, the ENER-
G8 is a coalition of eight energy-intensive manufacturing companies such as 
BASF and Mercedes-Benz. This group has also placed pressure on national en-
 
25ergy producers to organise at the EU level, and corresponds to the ‘Seven Sis-
ters’ in the United States. Fifth, the International Communications Round Table 
is a diverse group (including IBM, Sony, Microsoft, Reuters and Macmillan) 
that tries to influence the development of an information society in the EU. The 
sixth actor is the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations, which is 
an important Euro-federation of national associations. It tries to influence spe-
cific policies, e.g. foreign policy and trade negotiations. 
 
These multinational firms have more policy impact than national interest groups 
due to their size and international co-operation, allowing them to share the costs 
of lobbyism (see Greenwood and Aspinwall, 1998, for more evidence on this 
issue). Lobbying is necessary to keep one’s position relative to competitors. 
Kurrild-Klitgaard (1998) concludes, based on Vaubel (1994), that a vast major-
ity of the money spent by the EU is for transfers rather than for collective 
goods. For example, at least 72 per cent of the total EU budget is spent on trans-
fer activities favouring interest groups, mainly industrial groupings. 
3.3. Consumers 
Consumer organisations are, as large groups, weak, due to the logic of group 
size in Section 2. Therefore, the EU Commission funds and promotes consumer 
organisations at the EU level. 
 
The five main consumer organisations at the EU level are; The European Con-
sumers’ Organisation (which is the strongest), The Confederation of Family 
Organisations in the European Community, The European Trade Union Con-
federations, The European Community of Consumer Co-operatives, and The 
European Interregional Institute for Consumer Affairs. These groups receive 
about 1/3 of their budgets as subsidizes from the EU, for example, in 1994 the 
Commission gave €300,000 to The European Consumers’ Organisation, and 
€200,000 to each of the other organisations (Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998). 
While it may be a good idea to counterbalance business in this way, so that the 
EU Commission can get information from both parties, the risk is that the con-
 
26sumer organisations are ‘bought’ by the Commission, and in this way serve the 
bureaucratic interests of the Commission rather than the consumers. 
3.4. Environmentalists 
Public interest groups, such as environmental groups are weak too due to group 
size. As demonstrated by Daugbjerg and Svendsen (2001), consumer and envi-
ronmental groups do not have much influence compared to business groups. 
This claim is documented, for example, by a detailed analysis of the actual de-
sign of CO2 taxation in the five countries that, to date, have introduced CO2 
taxation, namely, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and The Netherlands. 
Here, Daugbjerg and Svendsen (2001) find a large difference between the CO2 
tax rate applicable to the consumers and the one applicable to producers. In 
general, CO2 taxes were non-uniform and consumers, on average, pay a tax rate 
that is six times higher than that paid by producers. Furthermore, producers 
were subsidised by favourable refund systems. Therefore, these empirical find-
ings on CO2 taxation support the theoretical prediction that rent-seeking pro-
ducers would influence political decision-making and avoid taxation. The au-
thors argued that industry has been successful in seeking to obtain rent against 
green taxation, whereas consumers were less successful due to group size. The 
net benefits for individual consumers or environmentalists are clearly negative; 
it does not pay to take the initiative by organising the whole group into collec-
tive action in order to capture the total net benefits. Producers constitute a small 
group and are therefore well organised. It is even possible for individual group 
action to take place without any wider organisation occurring, as our example 
illustrated. Therefore, due to weak rent-seeking power, Daugbjerg and Svend-
sen (2001) argue that consumers are taxed at a much higher rate than the well-
organised producers. 
 
Because of the lack of capacity to organise among large groups, the EU Com-
mission offers funding to public interest groups, and all of the seven environ-
mental core organisations listed below have accepted funding, except for 
Greenpeace. This so-called ‘Group of Seven’ is an informal arrangement where 
 
27members can participate when it suits them, (see Svendsen, 2003). Officially, 
the EU Commission provides financial assistance to make the EU more aware 
of the environment. (Greenwood and Aspinwall, 1998). 
 
The Group of Seven consists of the following members: First, The European 
Environmental Bureau, which was created in 1974 and was the first environ-
mental organisation to be set up at the EU level. Second, Friends of the Earth 
Europe, representing 29 organisations in 28 countries. Third, Greenpeace has an 
EU unit in Brussels to help its mother organisation in executing various cam-
paigns. It does not receive funding from the EU Commission because it wants 
to maintain its financial and political independence. Fourth, the World Wide 
Fund for Nature is the voice of 14 national organisations. Fifth, the Climate 
Network Europe is one of eight regional units in the international Climate Ac-
tion Network. Their specific aim is to prevent the greenhouse effect. Sixth, 
BirdLife International lobby specifically on policies that relate to birds and their 
habitats. Seventh, The European Federation for Transport and the Environment 
addresses, in particular, as the name implies, road transportation and air quality. 
As noted, all seven environmental organisations, except for Greenpeace, are 
funded by the EU Commission. 
4. Conclusion 
Introducing a political economy framework into the analysis of instrument 
choice facilitates an explanation of motives behind the decisions of the EU and 
also offers an assessment of the prospects of the EU reaching, by use of the 




One reason for switching to the grandfathered approach has been to reduce the 
costs of regulation for those groups that bear the main burdens of regulation, in 
our case the industry group, and in this way increase the support for meeting the 
Kyoto target. However, while all relevant interest groups either prefers grand-
fathered to auction or are indifferent between the two approaches, and, hence, 
clearly support this switch, this does not necessarily imply that there will be more support for the Kyoto target. Our counterintuitive results stems from the 
fact that permit owners have an (strategic) incentive to increase the price of the 
permits. Only when the permit price is sufficiently increased as the numbers of 
permits are reduced, will incumbent firms lobby for fewer permits, and support 
a more stringent environmental target, compared to the auction case. But from a 
theoretical point of view, the opposite conclusion is valid as well. If the permit 
price is not sufficiently increased as the numbers of permits are reduced, in-
cumbent firms will lobby for more permits, and support a less stringent envi-
ronmental target, compared to the auction case. Which of the two situations will 
prevail is an empirical matter for future research. 
 
The conclusion is interesting from both a theoretical point of view, showing the 
complex interaction between choice of instrument and support for a particular 
level of environmental regulation, as well with respect to the prospect of the EU 
meeting its Kyoto target level. Intuition suggests that by choosing the instru-
ment that receives the most support of the influential interest groups, it will be 
easier to sustain (or even improve upon) the proposed environmental regulation. 
However, as shown in this paper, this is not necessarily true. The reason is that 
the rent that interest groups can capture by choosing among different instru-
ments and the rent that such groups can capture from changes in the environ-
mental target level is non-monotonic. In particular, while in the case of taxes or 
auctioned permits, incumbent firms always prefer less strict regulation, given a 
grandfathered approach, this preference will (or will not) be re-enforced de-
pending on how the permit price changes as the environmental target level 
changes. For the particular case of the EU grandfathered permit system, this can 
only be determined empirically, and presumably first when the permit market is 
functioning. The issue of the connection between choice of instrument and the 
“politically feasible” level of emissions reductions is a very important one that 
deserves more attention. 
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33Appendix 
Table 1. EU member states’ greenhouse gas emissions
∗ 
 
 GHG  emissions 




Austria 76.9  79.2  2.6%  -13.9% 
Belgium 136.7  140.4  2,8%  -7.5% 
Denmark 70.0  73.0  4.0%  -21.0% 
Finland 77.1  76.2  -1.1%  0.0% 
France 545.7  544.5  -0.2%  0.0% 
Germany 1206.5  982.4  -18,7%  -21.0% 
Greece 105.3  123.2  16.9%  25.0% 
Ireland 53.5  65.3  22.1%  13.0% 
Italy 518.3  541.1  4.4%  -6.5% 
Luxembourg 10.8  6.1  -43.3% -28% 
Netherlands 215.8  230.1  6.1%  -6.0% 
Portugal 64.6  79.3  22.4%  27.0% 
Spain 305.8  380.2  23.2%  15.0% 
Sweden 69.5  70.7  1.5%  4.0% 
Total EU-15  4199 4030  -4.0%  -8.0% 






































34Department of Environmental and Business Economics 
Institut for Miljø- og Erhvervsøkonomi (IME) 
 
 





Issued working papers from IME 
Udgivne arbejdspapirer fra IME 
No.    
1/99  Frank Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Hans Frost 
Asymmetrisk information og regulering af 
forurening 
2/99 Finn  Olesen  Monetær integration i EU 
3/99 Frank  Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Regulation of Renewable Resources in Fed-
eral Systems: The Case of Fishery in the EU 
4/99 Villy  Søgaard  The Development of Organic Farming in 
Europe 
5/99 Teit  Lüthje 
Finn Olesen 
EU som handelsskabende faktor? 
6/99  Carsten Lynge Jensen  A Critical Review of the Common Fisheries 
Policy 
7/00  Carsten Lynge Jensen  Output Substitution in a Regulated Fishery 
8/00 Finn  Olesen  Jørgen Henrik Gelting – En betydende dansk 
keynesianer 
9/00 Frank  Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regula-
tion: The Case of Illegal Landings 
10/00 Finn  Olesen  Moral, etik og økonomi 
11/00 Birgit  Nahrstedt  Legal Aspect of Border Commuting in the 
Danish-German Border Region 
12/00 Finn  Olesen  Om Økonomi, matematik og videnskabelighed 
- et bud på provokation 
 
3513/00  Finn Olesen 
Jørgen Drud Hansen 
European Integration: Some stylised facts 
14/01  Lone Grønbæk  Fishery Economics and Game Theory 
15/01  Finn Olesen  Jørgen Pedersen on fiscal policy - A note 
16/01  Frank Jensen  A Critical Review of the Fisheries Policy: 
Total Allowable Catches and Rations for 
Cod in the North Sea 
17/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Are uniform solutions focal? The case of 
international environmental agreements 
18/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Group Uniform Solutions 
19/01  Frank Jensen  Prices versus Quantities for Common Pool 
Resources 
20/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Uniform Reductions are not that Bad 
21/01  Finn Olesen 
Frank Jensen 
A note on Marx 
22/01  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Hot air in Kyoto, cold air in The Hague 
23/01  Finn Olesen  Den marginalistiske revolution: En dansk 
spire der ikke slog rod? 
24/01  Tommy Poulsen  Skattekonkurrence og EU's skattestruktur 
25/01  Knud Sinding  Environmental Management Systems as 
Sources of Competitive Advantage 
26/01  Finn Olesen  On Machinery. Tog Ricardo fejl? 
27/01  Finn Olesen  Ernst Brandes: Samfundsspørgsmaal - en 
kritik af Malthus og Ricardo 
28/01  Henrik Herlau 
Helge Tetzschner 
Securing Knowledge Assets in the Early 
Phase of Innovation 
29/02  Finn Olesen  Økonomisk teorihistorie 
Overflødig information eller brugbar bal-
last? 
30/02  Finn Olesen  Om god økonomisk metode 
– beskrivelse af et lukket eller et åbent so-
cialt system? 
31/02  Lone Grønbæk Kronbak  The Dynamics of an Open Access: The case 
of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery - A Strategic 
Approach - 
 
3632/02  Niels Vestergaard 
Dale Squires 
Frank Jensen 
Jesper Levring Andersen 
Technical Efficiency of the Danish Trawl 
fleet: Are the Industrial Vessels Better 
Than Others? 
33/02  Birgit Nahrstedt 
Henning P. Jørgensen 
Ayoe Hoff 
Estimation of Production Functions on 
Fishery: A Danish Survey 
34/02  Hans Jørgen Skriver  Organisationskulturens betydning for vi-
densdelingen mellem daginstitutionsledere 
i Varde Kommune 
35/02  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Rent-seeking and grandfathering: The case 
of GHG trade in the EU 
36/02  Philip Peck 
Knud Sinding 
Environmental and Social Disclosure and 
Data-Richness in the Mining Industry 
37/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Fighting windmills? EU industrial interests 
and global climate negotiations 
38/03  Finn Olesen  Ivar Jantzen – ingeniøren, som beskæftige-
de sig med økonomi 
39/03  Finn Olesen  Jens Warming: den miskendte økonom 
40/03  Urs Steiner Brandt  Unilateral actions, the case of interna-
tional environmental problems 
41/03  Finn Olesen  Isi Grünbaum: den politiske økonom 
42/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Hot Air as an Implicit Side Payment Ar-
rangement: Could a Hot Air Provision 






Application of the Inverse Almost Ideal 
Demand System to Welfare Analysis 
44/03  Finn Olesen  Rudolf Christiani – en interessant rigs-
dagsmand? 
45/03  Finn Olesen  Kjeld Philip – en økonom som også blev 
politiker 
46/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Bureaucratic Rent-Seeking in the European 
Union 






48/03  Eva Roth 
Susanne Jensen 
Impact of recreational fishery on the for-
mal Danish economy 
49/03  Helge Tetzschner 
Henrik Herlau 
Innovation and social entrepreneurship in 
tourism -A potential for local business de-
velopment? 
50/03  Lone Grønbæk Kronbak 
Marko Lindroos 
An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fisher-
men and Authorities forming Coalitions 
51/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
The Political Economy of Climate Change 
Policy in the EU: Auction and Grand-
fathering 
 
 